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about	 the	 need	 for	 an	 evidence	 base	 for	 safety	 case	 adoption.	 	 We	 focus	 on	 digital	 health	
innovations,	because	safety	cases	are	likely	to	be	particularly	relevant	for	software-based	systems	
including,	more	recently,	machine	learning	technologies,	due	to	their	increased	complexity,	fast	











is	 to	 communicate	 why	 a	 product,	 system	 or	 service	 is	 deemed	 acceptably	 safe	 for	 use	 in	 a	




such	as	hazard	and	 risk	 analyses,	 design	 specifications,	 testing	and	empirical	 evaluation.	 	 For	
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intended	 to	 demonstrate	 compliance	 with	 regulations.	 	 While	 standards	 such	 as	 ISO	 14971	
(Medical	Devices	–	Application	of	Risk	Management	to	Medical	Devices)	take	a	risk-based	approach,	
the	lack	of	regulatory	expectation	for	providing	an	explicit	argument	for	how	the	body	of	evidence	
meets	 the	 regulatory	 requirements	 can	 reduce	 transparency	 and	 weaken	 confidence.	 	 As	 an	
analogy,	the	safety	case	can	be	thought	of	as	the	discussion	in	a	research	paper,	as	it	explains	and	





A	 review	 by	 the	 Health	 Foundation	 describes	 safety	 case	 practices	 across	 six	 industries:		
automotive,	civil	aviation,	defence,	nuclear,	petrochemical	and	railways.(5)		Safety	cases	are	used	
widely	across	these	safety-critical	industries,	particularly	in	the	UK	(see	a	review(10)	for	further	
details).	 	 The	UK	nuclear	 industry	 adopted	 safety	 cases	 in	 1965,	 following	 the	Windscale	 fire	
accident	 in	1957.	 	Accidents	were	major	drivers	 for	 the	adoption	of	safety	cases	also	 in	other	
industries,	such	as	offshore	oil	and	gas	production	(Piper	Alpha	oil	platform	explosion	1988)	and	
railways	 (e.g.	 King’s	 Cross	 escalator	 fire	 1987;	 Clapham	main	 line	 derailment	 1988).	 	 In	 the	
automotive	 domain,	 the	 increased	 complexity	 of	 interconnected	 electronics	 and	 software	
components	 was	 reflected	 in	 a	 requirement	 for	 an	 automotive	 safety	 case	 specified	 in	 the	
international	standard	on	automotive	functional	safety	(ISO	26262).		
	







In	 England,	 NHS	 Digital	 issued	 two	 risk	 management	 standards	 for	 health	 information	
technology,	 which	 specify	 safety	 assurance	 requirements	 and	 practices	 including	 the	
development	of	clinical	safety	cases	for	both	manufactures	and	health	organisations	(referred	to	




















































involved	 in	 the	design,	operation	and	assessment	of	 the	aircraft.	 	Such	a	culture	was	 found	to	









An	 Australian	 report	 identifies	 five	 key	 criteria	 for	 successful	 safety	 case	 regimes:(13)	 (i)	 an	
established	risk	or	hazard	management	framework;	(ii)	a	legal	requirement	to	make	the	case	to	
the	regulator;	(iii)	a	competent	and	independent	regulator;	(iv)	workforce	involvement;	and	(v)	
a	 general	 duty	 of	 care	 imposed	 on	 the	 operator.	 	 It	 is	 clear	 that	most	 health	 systems	 do	 not	
currently	meet	these	success	criteria,	not	least	because	much	of	the	patient	safety	improvement	
work	 is	 driven	 by	 outcomes	 (reactive)	 rather	 than	 by	 consideration	 of	 risk	 in	 processes	 and	
systems	(proactive),	while	regulators	also	do	not	provide	incentives	for	reducing	risk	as	such.(17)	
	
























that	 includes	 drug	 libraries	 developed	 by	 the	






exclusive	 focus	 on	 technical	 smart	 pump	 failures,	









Post-deployment	monitoring	 Routine	 audit	 can	 be	 used	 to	 check	 and	 challenge	
assumptions,	e.g.	routine	audit	of	smart	pump	event	








However,	 in	 order	 to	 facilitate	 and	 achieve	 successful	 adoption	 of	 safety	 case	 practices	 in	
healthcare,	suggestions	for	the	use	of	clinical	safety	cases	(as	 in	the	HSIB	safety	observations)	







be	 better	 placed	 than	 other	 industries,	 because	 the	 rigorous	 evaluation	 of	 complex	
interventions	has	gained	a	 lot	of	 traction	 in	 recent	years,	and	because	 (sadly)	adverse	
events	happen	at	a	rate	that	is	more	amenable	to	statistical	analysis.	











notion	of	 acceptable	 levels	 of	 risk,	 and	a	 framework	 that	 can	be	used	 in	 the	decision-
making	 process	 about	 the	management	 of	 risk.	 	 In	 safety-critical	 industries	 decisions	
about	 risk	 reduction	 are	 based	 on	 the	 ALARP	 principle,	 but	 the	 health	 systems	 face	
different	 challenges,	 such	 as	 the	 duty	 to	 provide	 care	 to	 an	 ageing	 population	 with	









digital	 health	 innovations,	 but	 any	 such	 suggestion	 needs	 to	 be	 underpinned	 by	 far-reaching	
structural	 changes.	 	 These	 include	 the	 rigorous	 evaluation	 of	 safety	 case	 practices	 and	 their	
impact	on	outcomes,	the	scaling	up	of	education	and	capability	around	proactive	patient	safety	
management	 practices,	 and	 the	 establishment	 of	 an	 agreed	 framework	 for	 how	 to	make	 and	
justify	decisions	about	patient	safety	risks.			
	
REFERENCES	
	
1.	 Agboola	SO,	Bates	DW,	Kvedar	JC.	Digital	health	and	patient	safety.	JAMA	:	the	journal	of	
the	American	Medical	Association.	2016;315:1697-8.	
2.	 Furniss	D,	Dean	Franklin	B,	Blandford	A.	The	devil	is	in	the	detail:	How	a	closed-loop	
documentation	system	for	IV	infusion	administration	contributes	to	and	compromises	patient	
safety.	Health	Informatics	Journal.	2019:1460458219839574.	
3.	 Sujan	M,	Scott	P,	Cresswell	K.	Digital	health	and	patient	safety:	Technology	is	not	a	magic	
wand.	Health	Informatics	Journal.	2019.	
4.	 Healthcare	Safety	Investigation	Branch.	Procurement,	usability	and	adoption	of	‘smart	
infusion’	pumps.	Farnham:	Healthcare	Safety	Investigation	Branch;	2020.	
5.	 Bloomfield	R,	Chozos	N,	Embrey	D,	Henderson	J,	Kelly	T,	Koornneef	F,	et	al.	Using	safety	
cases	in	industry	and	healthcare.	London:	Health	Foundation;	2012.	
6.	 Dean	Franklin	B,	Shebl	NA,	Barber	N.	Failure	mode	and	effects	analysis:	too	little	for	too	
much?	BMJ	quality	&	safety.	2012;21(7):607-11.	
7.	 Macrae	C.	The	problem	with	incident	reporting.	BMJ	quality	&	safety.	2015;25:71-5.	
8.	 Sutcliffe	KM,	Paine	L,	Pronovost	PJ.	Re-examining	high	reliability:	actively	organising	for	
safety.	BMJ	quality	&	safety.	2017;26:248-51.	
9.	 Dixon-Woods	M,	Martin	G,	Tarrant	C,	Bion	J,	Goeschel	C,	Pronovost	P,	et	al.	Safer	Clinical	
Systems:	Evaluation	Findings.	London:	Health	Foundation;	2014.	
Accepted	manuscript:	Sujan	MA,	Habli	I.		Safety	cases	for	digital	health	innovations:	can	the	
work?	BMJ	Qual	Saf	2021;	doi:10.1136/bmjqs-2021-012983	
10.	 Sujan	MA,	Habli	I,	Kelly	TP,	Pozzi	S,	Johnson	CW.	Should	healthcare	providers	do	safety	
cases?	Lessons	from	a	cross-industry	review	of	safety	case	practices.	Safety	Science.	
2016;84:181-9.	
11.	 Graydon	PJ.	The	Many	Conflicting	Visions	of	‘Safety	Case’.		47th	Annual	IEEE/IFIP	
International	Conference	on	Dependable	Systems	and	Networks	Workshops	(DSN-W);	Denver,	
USA:	IEEE;	2017.	p.	103-4.	
12.	 Graydon	MS.	Towards	efficacy	hypotheses	for	safety	cases.		16th	European	Dependable	
Computing	Conference	(EDCC);	Munich,	Germany:	IEEE;	2020.	p.	51-8.	
13.	 Hopkins	A.	WP	87	-	Explaining	“Safety	Case”.	Canberra:	National	Research	Centre	for	
OHS	Regulation;	2012.	
14.	 Leveson	N.	The	use	of	safety	cases	in	certification	and	regulation.	Journal	of	System	
Safety.	2011;47(6).	
15.	 Steinzor	R.	Lessons	from	the	North	Sea:	Should	"Safety	Cases"	come	to	America?	.	Boston	
College	Environmental	Affairs	Law	Review.	2011;38(2):417-44.	
16.	 Haddon-Cave	C.	The	Nimrod	Review:		An	independent	review	into	the	broader	issues	
surrounding	the	loss	of	the	RAF	Nimrod	MR2	aircraft	XV230	in	Afghanistan	in	2006.	London:	
The	Stationary	Office;	2009.	
17.	 Sujan	MA,	Habli	I,	Kelly	TP,	Gühnemann	A,	Pozzi	S,	Johnson	CW.	How	can	health	care	
organisations	make	and	justify	decisions	about	risk	reduction?	Lessons	from	a	cross-industry	
review	and	a	health	care	stakeholder	consensus	development	process.	Reliability	Engineering	&	
System	Safety.	2017;161:1-11.	
18.	 Health	Foundation.	Exploring	the	potential	use	of	safety	cases	in	health	care.	London:	
Health	Foundation;	2014.	
19.	 Habli	I,	White	S,	Sujan	M,	Harrison	S,	Ugarte	M.	What	is	the	safety	case	for	health	IT?	A	
study	of	assurance	practices	in	England.	Safety	Science.	2018;110:324-35.	
	
